The article by Wing et al. (1) introduced the idea of calculating the relative intensity of radioactive fallout between sectors of a circle drawn around the accident at Three Mile Island. The partition derived from wind and weather data allowed a comparison of ratios of radiation exposure between sectors with cancer incidence ratios and bypassed much of the uncertainty involved in calculating actual doses. The results indicated that higher fallout was correlated with higher cancer incidence. Considering that the average levels of radioactivity in each sector were low, this could be interpreted as evidence for a proportional carcinogenic response to low doses of ionizing radiation. There is, however, a simpler way to interpret the same set of data.
Wing et al. (1) reported that some of the people exposed to the fallout from the accident showed signs of acute radiation damage. They also reported that ground measurements of radioactivity were not adequate to show the details of distribution of the fallout or the resulting doses to individuals. We are free to infer that the fallout was patchy, that some of the residents were exposed to high doses of ionizing radiation, and that the data of Wing et al. (1) show a correlation of the frequency of high exposure "hits" on people in each sector with the sector's share of the region's radioactive burden. In this view, increases in cancer incidence were simply correlated with the number of people hit At the heart of the matter, it seems to us, is Wing's assertion that our original interpretation is based on circular reasoning. He makes this charge, he says, because we did not believe in the hypothesis under test. The first of two objections to this charge is that it is untrue. We had no such simplistic belief. At the outset, in the light of the uncertainties about the dose of radiation from the 1979 nudear accident, and also of a reported cluster of deaths that conceivably pointed to acceleration of cancers already initiated, we accepted the possibility ofan effect.
At the same time, given the short postaccident observation period and the putatively low dose, we were doubtful that any but the most radiosensitive cancers could be detected. We did not seek, but were sought out, to investigate on behalf of the TMI Public Health Fund. Our acceptance of the considerable undertaking involved was realistic, with no great expectation of startling results. Public duty at a time when fear and unrest beset the affected communities was a strong motive.
This mistaken allegation about our beliefs is much the lesser of our two objections. The greater objection is to Wing Wing's more specific case against our report rests mainly on two particular issues, namely, his use of relative rather than absolute dose and the adjustments he made for baseline conditions. Let us take these in turn.
Wing makes much of his use of relative dose as "an alternative logical approach" and seems to reproach us on this score [see Wing et al. (2) , page 53, second and third columns]. Although they later note that we in fact used relative dose, in remarks to the press (5) we are again reproved. So we must make clear that all our major analyses and results in fact derived precisely from the use of relative dose.
Relative dose is not an exact or complete description ofwhat we did. In a major and labor-intensive effort, one of us U.
Beyea) carried out detailed topographic and meteorologic mapping of the area to model estimates of the direction and concentration of radiation emissions from the accident, from routine operations of the plant, and from background radiation. To our knowledge, ours was a unique approach to deriving exposure measures in the face of uncertain actual dose. We also divided the local area at risk into 69 census-derived Correspondence small tracts. We then compared cancer incidence and mortality rates in the tracts most heavily exposed with those less exposed, having taken account of both background radiation and routine plant emissions.
What Wing et al. (2) themselves did about relative dose is not clear to us. In their paper, no description was apparent, nor did we recognize any consideration of background radiation or routine emissions, both strong features of our overall analysis. We assume that they made use of our estimates of radiation distribution from the accident.
In our analysis, we judged observations after the accident to be the critical test in making adjustments for baseline values. We were cautious in adjusting for demographic and other such variables from the situation existing before the accident because of uncertainties in these data. No information was to be had about subsequent migration, and the target population could only be that exposed to the accident and remaining in the district thereafter.
In any case, in the matter of cancers as an outcome, our study sought effects of the accident strictly in one direction. On There is neither mystery nor obfuscation in our presentation of the data. We are not sure we can say the same for Wing et al. They charge that we were constrained in our analyses in respect of emissions estimated by the judge's antecedent order. Certainly, we had no direct access to the records of the TMI Utility, but as far as we know, what was available was published. Of course, in using our models Wing et al. (2) operate under exactly the same constraint. We do not see that they find anything of note not reported by us and, indeed, they report rather fewer results than we do and in a less acessible manner.
Contrary to yet another allegation, our recommendation was firm [to the TMI Public Health Fund and also in print (4, 8) ] that a follow-up was needed, both to allow larger numbers of cases to accumulate in the aftermath of the accident and to collect individual level data on possible exposure and confounding.
In sum, then, Wing et al. (2) Although controversies over scientific findings are common, the topic of health effects of ionizing radiation has generated an exceptional amount of heat. Despite a century of research since Roentgen's discovery of X rays, fundamental disagreements exist over biophysical mechanisms, dose-response assumptions, analytical strategies, interspecies extrapolations, and the representativeness of studies of select human populations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) . In the United States, the last decade has seen revelations about human radiation experimentation (8) and a shift in responsibility for radiation health effects research from the Department of Energy to the Department of Health and Human Services, stimulated by concerns over secrecy and conflict of interest (9,10). These disagreements have been amplified by public and scientific debates over military, energy, and medical applications of nuclear technology (11).
As one of the best known technological failures of the nuclear era, the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant has generated its share of controversy, most recently in the pages of Environmental Health Perspectives (12-16). In his letter, Susser raises a number of important issues related to the context and logic of research on health effects from the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) (17). We would like to follow his lead by giving some background regarding our involvement in the study of cancer incidence in the 10-mile area around TMI and also respond to some of his specific points regarding the logic and methods of the original study and our reanalysis.
Susser notes that he and his colleagues did not seek the opportunity to study cancer incidence around TMI, but were asked to investigate the accident "on behalf of the TMI Public Health Fund" (17). The Fund, financed by the nuclear industry as a result of a legal settlement, was governed by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which imposed requirements regarding the conduct of research and the review and approval of reports by attorneys for the industry (1i). We do not suggest that this led Susser and colleagues to alter findings or purposefully construct research to support the industry. However, to the extent that all research is influenced by assumptions and beliefs from the framing of questions to the interpretation of evidence, the context of negotiation with industry representatives is important to understanding the research product.
Like Susser, we did not seek out funding for our reanalysis and, like the original research, our work was conducted in a context that is important to understanding the product. We were asked to review Susser and Hatch's data on cancer incidence by attorneys for approximately 2,000 plaintiffs in a class action suit that was before the same court that administered the TMI Public Health Fund. Civil suits may be a poor way to address public health problems; however, in our society, civil action has played an important role by bringing health issues (including asbestos, tobacco, air and water pollution) to public attention, and has provided some recourse to members of the public seeking protection from powerful industries.
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